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Entrebrawneurial Britain
I strut around my stately life
Hand in hand with lover and wife.
I even own a share or two
In a family ﬁrm my father grew.
Of course I have not the slightest view
On what this ﬁrm is supposed to do.
Nor have I any reason to care
Since in absentia I sit in a Chair,
Of a Board that yesterday I chose to hire
And tomorrow I’ve decided that I will ﬁre.
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The United Kingdom is a strange country. It does not have concentrated
ownership; most countries do. It does not have pyramid structures; most
countries do. Family ownership is of limited signiﬁcance; in most countries
it is extensive. There are few dual-class shares; in many countries they are ex-
tensive. It has an active market in corporate control; elsewhere, it is largely
nonexistent.
By way of a measure of its peculiarity, Becht and Mayer (2001) report
that in a majority of listed Austrian, German, and Italian ﬁrms there is a
single voting block of shares that commands a majority of votes in these
companies. Families account for 45 percent of blocks in Austria, 32 per-
cent in Germany, and 30 percent in Italy. The average size of the blocks is
26 percent in Austria, 27 percent in Germany, and 20 percent in Italy. In
the United Kingdom, on average the largest voting block will usually cast
under 10 percent of votes, while less than 5 percent of blocks are attribut-
able to families, and the average size of their blocks is only 5 percent. There
is a stark contrast in the signiﬁcance of families in corporate control be-
tween the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe.
Even by the standards of the United States, the United Kingdom is odd.
Dual-class shares are by no means absent from the United States. Power-
ful families established some of the largest corporations in the United
States, and pyramids were, at least at one stage, widespread. The United
States may be odd, but Britain is even more peculiar.
Why is the United Kingdom so diﬀerent? Was it always so deviant? The
British business history literature would seem to suggest not. Family own-
ership has been a dominant theme in British business history. Alfred Chan-
dler developed a thesis of comparative industrial performance around
diﬀerences between managerial capitalism in North America and family
organizations in Europe. He argued that the United Kingdom was held
back at the turn of the century by a continuing reliance on family as against
professional managerial capitalism. Successes were restricted to indus-
tries in which there were modest investment requirements, most notably
branded packaged goods. Companies such as Beechams, Cadbury, Col-
man, Reckitt, and Rowntree were dominated by their owners and had little
professional management. The consequences were most seriously felt in
those industries that required large-scale investments—chemicals, electri-
cal equipment, and metals; these declined markedly in relation to their
German and U.S. competitors. David Landes (1965, pp. 536–64) described
the stereotypical image of the British family ﬁrm as being an organization
founded by fanatical fathers and succeeded by squabbling siblings who
“worked at play and played at work.”
According to this view, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as in
most other countries, powerful families dominated the British corporate
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presumably their extinction was a consequence of their incompetence. As
a result, the origins of the British corporate system are quite conventional,
and its current anomalous status is a consequence of the normal workings
of market forces.
Plausible though this story is, we argue in this paper that it is probably
not an accurate and certainly not a complete description of what tran-
spired. At the very least, it does not capture the rich interaction that oc-
curred between ﬁnancial markets and companies in the United Kingdom.
There are many aspects of this that are misleading. The ﬁrst is that while
families were important at the beginning of the twentieth century, their sig-
niﬁcance did not in general derive from long-term large-scale ownership
ofBritish companies. By way of ownership, families were rapidly marginal-
ized. The pattern of ownership, which we report above as characterizing
corporate British today, emerged early in the twentieth century.
Instead, the signiﬁcance of family inﬂuence claimed by Chandler comes
from a diﬀerent source. While families rapidly relinquished ownership,
they retained control through their positions on the boards of directors.
They often held the all-important position of chairman of the board, and
even if they did not, then their board representation was frequently dis-
proportionate to their ownership stakes. This is quite diﬀerent from the
pattern observed in Continental European countries of extensive family
ownership with delegated managerial control. In Britain families exerted
power without responsibility, whereas in most countries they had respon-
sibility with at least limited power.
Still more interesting than the nature of ownership and control was the
process by which it came about. Family ownership did not for the most part
decline because families sold out. They did not typically abandon ﬁrms
through company ﬂotations or share sales. Instead, their holdings were di-
luted in the process of issuing shares to ﬁnance growth. In a sample of ﬁrms
that we will describe below, we estimate that issues of shares associated
with acquisitions, rights issues, and placings accounted for almost two-
thirds of the decline in directors’ shareholdings over the period 1900 to
1950. A majority of this issuance arose from one particular activity of
ﬁrms, namely acquisitions. More than half of the dilution (36.2 percent) of
the 61.6 percent is associated with issues of shares for acquisitions. Shares
were not primarily issued to ﬁnance internal investments but rather to ac-
quire other ﬁrms.
The changing pattern of ownership of British ﬁrms during the century
was primarily a product of the immense amount of takeover activity that
occurred during the twentieth century. Hannah (1976), for example, docu-
ments the three major merger waves that occurred around 1900, 1920, and
1930. Many of these mergers were consolidations of several companies, es-
tablishing the corporate groupings that dominated the rest of the century.
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curred in largely unregulated equity markets with little protection to mi-
nority investors. In this paper we explore this acquisition process. We doc-
ument how it went through various stages. In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century there was no market for corporate control. All mergers were the re-
sult of an agreement between the two or more boards of the merging com-
panies. Often a holding company was created to buy all the shares of the
combining ﬁrms, with the old boards of directors forming a new board.
Mergers were the result of cooperation rather than competition between
companies for a target in an auction market.
During the 1940s and 1950s there were important changes in the U.K.
capital markets. First, following a number of scandals, minority investor
protection was strengthened at the end of the 1940s. Disclosure was im-
proved, and antidirector provisions were introduced. Second, there was a
sharp increase in institutional ownership. By 1960, institutions were the
largest shareholder in more than a third of the companies in our sample.
Third, and most signiﬁcantly, a market for corporate control emerged:
“For the ﬁrst time it became popular for the ownership of public compa-
nies to be determined simply by stock market transactions and for control
to pass thereby to parties previously unconnected with the ﬁrm” (Roberts
1992, p. 183).
Charles Clore launched the ﬁrst hostile takeover in 1953 for a large shoe
chain called J. Sears Holdings. This bid introduced the concept of paying a
signiﬁcant premium for the shares of target ﬁrms. Whereas before 1950
there was little diﬀerence in cost between partial and full acquisitions, the
emergence of hostile takeovers substantially increased the cost of acquir-
ing full ownership. As a consequence, it became attractive to make partial
rather than full bids for companies.
Companies responded by attempting to protect themselves and their
minority shareholders against the takeover threat. We estimate that within
a period of ﬁfteen years about 7.5 percent of listed companies had issued
dual-class shares with discriminatory voting rights. In others, they sought
protection under the wing of a friendly parent. In particular, in the brew-
ing industry, Whitbread provided protection through large stakes to sev-
eral local brewers under what became known as “the Whitbread umbrella.”
Partial acquisitions, dual-class shares, and strategic block holdings gave
rise, at least temporarily, to shareholding patterns that are currently com-
monplace on the Continent but were previously rare in the United King-
dom. This is a particularly interesting stage in the development of the
British corporation because it could at this point have switched into Con-
tinental European mode with dual-class shares and pyramids. In Japan,
similar takeovers threats in the post-WW2 period prompted the erection of
elaborate defenses in the form of cross-shareholdings that have persisted
until today. But this did not happen in Britain. Financial institutions had
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1960s, and with the agreement of the stock exchanges they were able to
deny these ﬁrms access to the capital markets. The result was the disman-
tling of the protective measures until they were virtually extinguished by
the 1980s. The elimination of dual-class shares and pyramids in the United
Kingdom was therefore due to the dominance of institutional investors. In
other countries, corporations were more signiﬁcant holders of corporate
equity1and derived beneﬁts from the retention of mechanisms such as pyr-
amids and dual-class shares for sustaining control.
Instead, the more enduring response to the emergence of a market for
corporate control was regulatory. The Takeover Panel was established in
1968. Its ﬁrst rules included mandatory bid and equal price requirements
ensuring that oﬀers would be made at the same price to all shareholders
once 30 percent of a target had been purchased. These two rules had the ef-
fect of preventing both discriminatory price oﬀers and the buildup of large
share blocks.
By the beginning of the 1970s the key features of current U.K. corporate
ownership and control were in place: substantial institutional sharehold-
ings, a hostile takeover market, and extensive minority investor protection.
Together they had the eﬀect of establishing active markets in corporate
control.
In a companion paper, we have documented that dilution of family own-
ership has been a feature of the whole of the twentieth century, in large part
due to share acquisitions. But not only was acquisition the main cause of
the dilution, it was also its main eﬀect. At the start of the century families
could expect to retain control over extended periods as directors, if not
owners, of their ﬁrms, and their approval was required before changes in
control through takeover could take place. By the end of the century, fam-
ily board representation was not suﬃcient to ensure continuity of control
in the face of hostile takeovers. This had two consequences. First, the fea-
ture that Chandler had noted of the dominance of management by fami-
lies was less evident by the end of the century. Second, dilution of owner-
ship had control as well as cash-ﬂow consequences for families.
Management had therefore become more professional, and families were
unable to preserve the continuity of control that they enjoyed in the ﬁrst
half of the century.
As Davies and Hopt (2004) note, despite similarities in the structure of
their capital markets and the common law nature of their legal systems, the
United Kingdom and United States today allocate decision rights regard-
ing takeover oﬀers in very diﬀerent ways. In the United Kingdom they re-
side with the target shareholders, whereas in those state jurisdictions in the
United States that are sympathetic to the use of poison pills as takeover de-
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1. See, for example, Franks and Mayer (2001) for data on corporate holdings in Germany.fenses, most notably in Delaware, they reside with the target management.
The exposure of target management to hostile takeovers in the United
Kingdom is not therefore simply a product of its common law or dispersed
ownership system. Politics, in the guise of the growing inﬂuence of institu-
tional investors in the second half of the twentieth century, may have been
atleast as important in establishing the United Kingdom’s unusually active
market in corporate control.
In section 10.2 we describe the data sets that we employ in this chapter.
In section 10.3, we record the evolution of family ownership, board repre-
sentation, and the rise of institutional share ownership. Section 10.4 de-
scribes the merger and acquisitions process in the ﬁrst of the century. Sec-
tion 10.6 looks at how a takeover market emerged in the second half of the
twentieth century. Section 10.7 concludes the chapter and examines the im-
plications of these developments for family control of British companies.
10.2 Data
We employ three data sets in this chapter. The ﬁrst comprises individual
ﬁrm data on the ownership and board representation of samples of ﬁrms
incorporated around 1900 and 1960. There were twenty ﬁrms that were in-
corporated or reincorporated between 1897 and 1903 and were still in ex-
istence in 2001 and twenty ﬁrms that were incorporated between 1958 and
1962 and were still in existence in 2001; we have collected data on all of
these. To avoid the obvious bias that might arise from the greater longevity
of the 1900 than the 1960 sample, we collected a third sample of twenty
ﬁrms incorporated around 1900 that are no longer in existence today. We
compare the evolution of ownership and control of the 1960 sample with
both the surviving and nonsurviving 1900 samples.
The data have been assembled from (a) archives of company accounts
and share registers (including names and size of shareholdings) stored at
Companies House in Cardiﬀ, and at the Public Records in Kew, Richmond
(Surrey);2 (b) new issue prospectuses at the Guildhall Library in London;
(c) annual issues of the Stock Exchange Year Book, which lists names of di-
rectors and the sources of any changes in issued capital; and (d) oﬃcial lists
of trading of securities from the British Library in London. Share registers
provided evidence of annual ownership changes, and the annual returns to
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2. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, ﬁrms in the United Kingdom have been re-
quired to ﬁle information at a central depository called Companies House, now situated in
Cardiﬀ, Wales. This is a remarkable and largely unique long-run source of data on ﬁrms.
However, it suﬀers from one deﬁciency: Companies House retains complete records on all
ﬁrms that are still in existence today but discards information on most, but not all, dead com-
panies. We therefore supplemented data from Companies House with a second source of
public information from the Public Records in Kew, Richmond (Surrey), which keeps some
information on dead companies.Companies House gave details of resignations of existing directors and ap-
pointments of new directors.
From these data, we collected names of directors, their shareholdings
(including those of their families), the date and amounts of capital issued
in acquisitions, new share issues via public and private placements, and
other changes in share capital, such as capitalizations of reserves. We
traced the founding family ownership from incorporation until the last
family member left the board by recording shareholdings and place of res-
idence of family members, taking account of name changes across genera-
tions when, for example, the daughter of a founder married. We also traced
shareholdings through intermediary ﬁrms. For outside shareholdings, we
limited ourselves to stakes greater than 1 percent of ordinary capital. We
used newspaper archives to document evidence of tender oﬀers and trad-
ing in provincial stock exchanges, especially in the early 1900s.
The second data set collected for this study includes information on an-
titakeover defenses (dual-class shares, voting right restrictions, and insider
block holdings) for about 1,800 listed ﬁrms in two London Stock Exchange
(LSE) industry classiﬁcations, breweries and industrials and commercials.
The third data set comes from Hannah’s (1974a) list of takeovers over
the period 1919 to 1939 and includes announcement dates of takeovers
from the Financial Times newspaper, the medium of exchange, dividend
changes and board turnover from the Stock Exchange Year Book, and
share prices from the daily oﬃcial list (at the Guildhall Library). News-
paper archives are used to document evidence on the hostility of takeover
activity, particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s.
10.3 Ownership and Board Representation
10.3.1 Ownership
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), the United Kingdom has had
one of the largest stock markets in the world throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. Table 10.1reports the number of companies listed on the LSE and the
market value of listed securities for the period 1853 to 1939. As the stock
exchange did not collect aggregate statistics over this period, several other
sources have had to be used. According to Killick and Thomas (1970) and
Michie (1999), around 1850, provincial stock exchanges had more listed
companies than the LSE—490 as against 200. Hart and Prais (1956) re-
cord a large expansion of listed companies on the LSE over the period 1885
to 1939, although their data refer only to industrial and commercial com-
panies. From 1963, the LSE has kept a continuous series of aggregate equity
market values, including preference and dual-class shares. One of the
most striking features is the marked decline in the number of listed ﬁrms
that has occurred over the past forty years (see table 10.1).
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nies incorporated around 1900 and twenty incorporated around 1960 that
were still in existence in 2001 (the “survivors”) and a sample of twenty
companies incorporated around 1900 that died during the century (“non-
survivors”). It documents the number of companies where the founding
family’s shareholding passes a particular threshold of 25 percent, 50 per-
cent, and 75 percent of equity. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2004) report that
insider ownership declined rapidly and at similar rates in the ﬁrst and sec-
ond halves of the century. Rates of ownership dispersion were similar in
samples of companies incorporated in 1900 and 1960. Table 10.2 conﬁrms
that family ownership was rapidly diluted throughout the century. By 1940,
forty years after incorporation, the number of ﬁrms in which families
owned more than 25 percent of shares had declined from thirteen to four
among the survivors. Family ownership was initially even less pronounced
among the nonsurvivors (nine out of twenty companies passed the 25 per-
cent threshold), but pro rata to the number of survivors it then declined less
rapidly to four out of twelve survivors in 1940.
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Table 10.1 The number of companies and market capitalization of companies listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE)
No. listed companies
Date LSE Provincial Source
A. Pre-1950
1847 490b Killick and Thomas (1970)
1853 200 Michie (1999)
1885 70a Hart and Prais (1956)
1907 571a Hart and Prais (1956)
1913 1,700 Rajan and Zingales (2003)
1939 1,712a Hart and Prais (1956)
United Kingdom International
No. of  Market  GDP  Market  Market 
No. of  equity  value  current  development  No. of  value 
companies securities (£/M) prices (GDP/MV) companies (£/M)
B. 1963–2000
1963 4,409 4,064 32,204
1970 3,418 3,197 37,793 44,200 0.86 387 57,135
1980 2,747 2,283 86,720 201,000 0.43 394 183,846
1990 2,006 2,081 450,544 479,000 0.94 553 1,124,131
2000 1,904 2,272 1,796,811 501 3,525,701
Notes: This table reports London Stock Exchange statistics on a number of listed companies and mar-
ket capitalization from various sources. 
aIndustrial companies only (Hart and Prais).
bManchester, Newcastle, Liverpool, and Leeds.Table 10.2 shows that this dilution of family ownership was even more
noticeable in the 1960 than in the 1900 sample. For example, forty years af-
ter incorporation, there was no company in the 1960 sample in which fam-
ily ownership passed the 25 percent threshold. Family ownership therefore
diminished rapidly throughout the century but much more so in the second
half of the century.
Table 10.3 documents how ﬁnancial institutions emerged to take the
place of families as dominant owners of corporate Britain around the
middle of the twentieth century. It reports the number of cases where a ﬁ-
nancial institution was the largest shareholder of our sample of ﬁrms.
Forty years after incorporation, there were four cases in the 1900 survivor
sample where a ﬁnancial institution was the largest shareholder, compared
with thirteen in 1990 for the 1960 sample. The average size of institutional
stakes was also larger in the second half of the century. The average stake
of the four ﬁnancial institutions that were the largest shareholders in the
1900 sample was 5.9 percent in 1940, compared with an average stake of
16.2 percent in the thirteen companies in the 1960 sample in 2000. Thus, in
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Table 10.2 Family shareholdings and ownership thresholds
Survivors Nonsurvivors
No. of 
25% 50% 75% N 25% 50% 75% N observations
1900 sample
1900 13 9 8 20 9 8 6 20 40
1910 10 7 7 20 9 8 5 20 40
1920 11 8 7 20 8 6 4 17 37
1930 7 4 3 20 8 4 3 16 36
1940 4 3 3 20 4 4 3 12 32
1950 3 3 2 20 4 3 3 10 30
1960 2 1 1 20 3 2 1 4 24
1970 0 0 0 20 2 1 1 3 23
1980 0 0 0 20 1 1 1 2 22
1990 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 1 21
2000 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 20
No. of 
25% 50% 75% observations
1960 sample
1960 16 15 7 20
1970 8 5 3 20
1980 7 2 1 20
1990 1 1 0 20
2000 0 0 0 20
Source: Own calculations.
Note: This table reports the number of companies in our sample where the founding family owns more
than 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of issued ordinary share capital, respectively.the ﬁrst half of the century institutional shareholdings were largely absent,
and where they were present they were quite small. In contrast, in the sec-
ond half of the century, there were a larger number of stakes held by insti-
tutions, and they were much more signiﬁcant in size.
In summary, family ownership declined rapidly in the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century, and institutions emerged to take the place of families
from the middle of the century.
10.3.2 Board Representation
Table 10.4 shows that family representation on boards persisted for much
longer than their ownership. It documents the proﬁle of board representa-
tion for the two samples of ﬁrms at ten-year intervals. Over forty years from
1900 to 1940, the percentage of board seats held by outside (nonfamily)
shareholders in the sample of survivor ﬁrms (panel A) increased from 46
percent in 1900 to 64 percent in 1940. The proportion of ﬁrms in which fam-
ilies occupied the position of chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) of the board
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Table 10.3 Is the largest shareholder an institution?
Survivors Nonsurvivors
Block  No. of  Block  No. of 
Institution size observations Institution size observations
1900 sample
1900 0 20 0 20
1910 1 5.00 20 0 20
1920 0 20 0 17
1930 0 20 1 6.90 16
1940 4 5.89 20 1 0.90 12
1950 7 3.73 20 3 8.95 10
1960 8 4.18 20 0 4
1970 9 5.35 20 0 3
1980 8 6.46 20 0 2
1990 16 10.77 20 1 11.70 1
2000 17 12.85 20 0 0
No. of 
Institution Block size observations
1960 sample
1960 0 20
1970 4 4.88 20
1980 5 16.27 20
1990 10 15.39 20
2000 13 16.20 20
Source: Own calculations.
Note: This table reports the number of companies where the largest shareholder is an institution, along
with the average size of these largest block holdings.Table 10.4 Board composition
Board members 
outside founding 
family (%) Board size
Family No.  of 
Mean Median CEO Mean Median observations
A. 1900 sample, survivors
1900 5.40 5.00 16 45.46 41.45 20
1910 5.80 5.00 17 44.48 52.75 20
1920 5.95 5.00 13 59.75 66.60 20
1930 6.45 6.00 10 64.37 72.35 20
1940 6.65 6.00 10 64.16 71.55 20
1950 6.90 6.50 9 71.10 87.50 20
1960 7.20 7.00 4 76.15 100.00 20
1970 9.15 8.00 2 81.88 100.00 20
1980 7.95 7.00 2 86.71 100.00 20
1990 8.25 8.00 2 90.68 100.00 20
2000 7.90 7.00 2 92.51 100.00 20
Mean 7.05 7.91 70.66
B. 1900 sample, nonsurvivors
1900 4.93 4.00 11 68.23 100.00 20
1910 5.33 5.00 10 76.44 100.00 20
1920 5.92 5.50 9 70.34 72.90 17
1930 5.82 5.00 8 72.82 77.70 16
1940 4.86 6.00 5 92.84 100.00 12
1950 3.50 3.50 3 95.83 100.00 10
1960 9.67 8.00 3 100.00 100.00 4
1970 5.50 5.50 2 100.00 100.00 3
1980 7.00 7.00 2 100.00 100.00 2
1990 4.00 4.00 0 100.00 100.00 1
2000 0 100.00 100.00 0
Mean 5.06 7.74 79.42
C. 1960 sample
1960 2.80 3.00 16 43.15 41.65 20
1970 5.55 5.00 12 66.48 77.50 20
1980 6.47 6.00 8 74.94 86.65 20
1990 7.35 7.00 4 82.55 100.00 20
2000 7.00 6.00 3 83.62 100.00 20
Mean 5.83 10.90 70.15
Source: Author calculations.
Note: This table reports board size and the percentage of board members that do not come
from the founding family.declined from 80 percent (i.e., sixteen out of twenty) to 50 percent (i.e., ten
out of twenty). As table 10.2 recorded, the proportion of survivor ﬁrms in
which families held more than 25 percent of shares declined much more rap-
idly by 45 percent from 65 percent (i.e., thirteen out of twenty) in 1900 to 20
percent (i.e., four out of twenty) in 1940. Family representation on the
boards did not therefore decline as rapidly as their ownership.
Table 10.5 provides a summary measure of this. It reports separation of
family ownership and control as measured by the diﬀerence between fam-
ily representation on the boards of ﬁrms and family ownership of shares. A
positive number means that family board representation is disproportion-
ate to family ownership. Table 10.5 shows that at the beginning of the cen-
tury, family ownership was in excess of family board representation, but by
1940 it had become disproportionately high.
Panel B of table 10.4 reports lower family board representation among
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Table 10.5 Separation of ownership and control
No. of  No. of  Full  No. of 
Survivors Survivors Nonsurvivors Nonsurvivors sample observations
1900 sample
1900 –1.16 20 5.69 20 1.86 40
1910 6.78 20 2.00 20 4.67 40
1920 –7.87 20 9.88 17 –1.00 37
1930 8.97 20 14.25 16 10.91 36
1940 15.60 20 6.17 12 13.16 32
1950 13.15 20 4.02 10 11.04 30
1960 14.99 20 0.00 4 12.45 24
1970 15.04 20 0.00 3 12.60 23
1980 12.03 20 0.00 2 11.13 22
1990 9.15 20 0.00 1 8.71 21
2000 6.69 20 0 6.69 20











Notes: This table reports mean and median separation of ownership and control. Separation is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the proportion of founding family members on the board and family share-
holdings. A negative value indicates that there is a greater proportion of family ownership than board
representation.the 1900 nonsurvivors than the survivors. Family board representation was
only 32 percent in 1900, in comparison to 55 percent among the survivors,
and it declined to 7 percent in 1940. There was therefore less family own-
ership and less family board representation among the nonsurvivors than
the survivors in 1900, and families failed to retain board positions among
nonsurvivors to the degree that they did in survivors. Table 10.5 conﬁrms
that family board representation did not increase to the same extent rela-
tive to ownership among nonsurvivors as among survivors. So families
retained neither ownership nor board positions among nonsurvivors.
Whether the decline of families on the boards as well as in the ownership
of nonsurvivors was a cause or a consequence of their demise is not a ques-
tion to which we attempt to provide an answer here. All we do is to note
that the diﬀerence in family ownership and board representation among
surviving and nonsurviving ﬁrms may be an interesting approach to eval-
uating the contribution of families to corporate performance.
In the second half of the century, family representation on boards de-
clined more rapidly. Forty years after incorporation, a family member was
chairman/CEO in three companies in the 1960 sample, in comparison to
ten in the 1900 survivors. Likewise, the proportion of seats on the boards
occupied by families declined to 16 percent forty years after incorporation
in the 1960 sample, in comparison to 36 percent in the 1900 sample. Thus,
family representation on boards as well as ownership declined more rap-
idly in the second than in the ﬁrst half of the century.
Table 10.4 shows that, relative to their ownership stakes, family repre-
sentation on boards moved in a very similar way in the 1960 sample com-
pared to the 1900 survivors, starting from slightly more ownership than
board representation in 1960 and ending with markedly more board rep-
resentation than ownership forty years after incorporation in 2000. Thus,
families did not match the very rapid decline in their ownership in the sec-
ond half of the century with their share of seats on boards of ﬁrms.
In summary, dilution of family ownership occurred rapidly throughout
the twentieth century. As the next section describes, this was primarily due
to growth through acquisition. However, in the ﬁrst half of the century
families were able to retain control in surviving ﬁrms through representa-
tion on the boards of ﬁrms. In the second half, board control as well as
ownership was rapidly extinguished. A new form of ownership, institu-
tions, emerged in the middle of the century to replace families, and, as we
document in section 10.5, a new form of corporate control, the hostile take-
over, appeared to replace that exerted by families.
10.4 Mergers and Acquisitions in the First Half of the Century
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2004) argue that the main cause of dispersion
of ownership during the twentieth century was equity issuance. In particu-
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cess issued equity to outside shareholders, thereby diluting insiders’ share-
holdings. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi report that insider holdings were di-
luted over the period 1900 to 1950 at an average rate of 12.6 percent per
annum. Of this, none was attributable to initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), 4.6
percent to rights issues, 20.8 percent to placings, and 36.2 percent to merg-
ers and acquisitions.3
During the ﬁrst half of the century, mergers and acquisitions were usu-
ally made by the bidder approaching the directors and agreeing to pur-
chase their shares: “An approach through the directors, followed by con-
trolled stock transfers on the recommendations of the directors (rather
than contested takeover raids) remained the norm in these years” (Hannah
1974b, p. 68). A price was negotiated, and management wrote to the share-
holders stating that “the oﬀer has been unanimously accepted by the Di-
rectors of your company for the whole of their individual shares, and they
have no hesitation in recommending its acceptance to the shareholders”
(Financial Times,19 January 1920). The same terms were oﬀered to outside
shareholders as the directors.
As Hannah (1974b) has noted, “The loyalty of shareholders to directors
was strong, and the directors of other companies had a natural aversion to
challenging it. Even if a direct bid were to be made, the directors of the vic-
tim ﬁrm remained in a strong position relative to their own shareholders.
In practice the shareholders would recognize the superiority of the direc-
tors’ information and tend to take their advice on the true value of the
company in relation to the bid price” (pp. 70–71); “Directors felt a respon-
sibility to recommend oﬀers to their shareholders when the bid price was
pitched reasonably” (pp. 68–69). It is therefore unsurprising that there was
a complete absence of hostile takeover bids in the ﬁrst half of the century.
The continuing presence of families on boards, in particular in the posi-
tion of chairman, even in the absence of ownership, may have been impor-
tant in upholding reputations. So too were titled directors. Florence (1953)
reports that there were 654 English peers as active members of city ﬁrms
in 1932. Titled directors were particularly common in the largest compa-
nies, although “at a rough estimate almost half the titled directors inherited
their title or acquired it by prowess in the ﬁghting services or sport and not
in business” (Florence, p. 245). Florence notes that “one well-known insur-
ance company in 1937 had among sixteen directors, three knights, one
baron, one marquis, one earl and two dukes” (p. 245). Likewise, May (1939)
reports that of 654 British peers, 189 of them were directors of companies
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3. In the ﬁrst half of the century shares were often traded without a prospectus. Shares
would simply be issued and sold directly by the company to subscribers or be sold through ad-
vertisements in the press. The IPO event was much more formal after 1948, when prospectuses
were compulsory and their content strictly regulated prior to trading on recognized stock ex-
changes such as the LSE.and held 562 directorates between them: “Sometimes a man with a ‘good
name,’ knowing nothing about the business and even without residence in
the country, is set up as chairman with the principal duty of reading the an-
nual speech, which has been written out for him, to the shareholders” (May,
p. 145). As Lord Justice Scrutton said in the Court of Appeal in the judg-
ment on Combined Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. 1932, “The company pro-
moter wants a man whose name will appeal to the public and who does not
know too much about the business. The name will attract capital—the com-
pany promoter will do the rest” (pp. 35–36 of the transcript).
In tables 10.6 and 10.7 we examine the workings of the acquisitions mar-
ket in the ﬁrst half of the century. We undertook a series of tests on bid pre-
mia, changes in boards, and dividend responses of targets similar to those
that are now routinely performed on recent acquisitions in the United
Kingdom and United States. We report data on forty-one mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&As) in the United Kingdom over the period 1919 to 1939.
This is the entire population of M&As that met three criteria: the market
value of target assets exceeded £1 million, the targets were listed on the
LSE, and they were classiﬁed by the LSE as being in one of three indus-
tries—breweries and distilleries; industrial and commercial; or iron, coal,
and steel.
Table 10.6 shows the proportion of target directors who were retained on
the board after the merger, the number of cases in which the chairman was
removed, and the change in dividends around the announcement of the
mergers. On average, two-thirds of the target directors remained on the tar-
get’s board after the acquisition. In fourteen of forty-one cases (approxi-
mately one-third of the total), the chairman was removed. In comparison,
in a study of thirty-ﬁve successful hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986,
Franks and Mayer (1996) report that 90 percent of directors were replaced
within two years of the bid’s being consummated. The equivalent ﬁgure for
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Table 10.6 Takeovers in the United Kingdom, 1919–39: Target board turnover and
dividend changes
Proportion of target board  Chairman  Dividend  No. of 
Time period resigning after takeover (%) resigned constant observations
1919–23 5.36 0 10 11
1924–28 33.76 3 11 12
1929–33 16.68 2 7 7
1934–39 57.80 9 8 10
Total 30.28 14 40
Sources: Hannah (1974b) and author calculations.
Notes: This table reports the proportion of target directors that resign after a takeover, the
number of target companies where the chairman resigns and the proportion of target com-
panies keeping the dividend constant two years prior to the takeover for a sample of 40
takeovers over the period 1919–39.thirty-ﬁve accepted bids was 50 percent. Board turnover was appreciably
lower in the ﬁrst half of the century in comparison with both accepted and
hostile bids in the second.4
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Total market value 
Time period No. EW EW (£/millions)
A. 1919–39
1919–23 11 –10.02 –3.34 31.5
1924–28 12 14.69 0.55 43.3
1929–33 7 –2.45 –1.13 19.0







B. Hostile takeovers, 1953–58
1953 J. Sears 122.22 90.48
1958 Savoy Hotel 87.00 19.53






Total market value 
No. EW VW EW VW (£/billions)
C. 1955–85
1955–59 151 28 25 16 11 0.5
1960–64 190 24 26 18 14 1.4
1965–69 262 27 24 19 12 3.7
1970–74 196 35 41 25 23 2.8
1975–79 383 38 34 30 22 3.8
1980–84 281 27 27 25 30 10.0
Mean 30 30 22 19
Notes: This table reports the bid premia for the United Kingdom in the twentieth century. Panel A con-
siders 40 U.K. takeovers over the period 1919–39 and computes premia as the raw (unadjusted) stock re-
turns for targets over the periods (–4 to 1) months and month 0, where month 0 is the announcement
month. Panel B refers to the ﬁrst three hostile takeover bids of the 1950s, as reported in Roberts (1992),
and computes premia as in panel A. Panel C refers to 1,463 U.K. takeovers in the period 1955–85 and
computes premia as the market-adjusted stock returns for targets over the periods (–4 to 1) months and
month 0, where month 0 is the announcement month. The source for panel C is Franks and Harris (1989).
4. This might indicate greater private beneﬁts accruing to target directors in the early part
of the century.Table 10.6 also shows very little change in dividends in the year of the bid
compared to the previous year in the 1919 to 1939 sample. In comparison,
Franks and Mayer (1996) report that dividends were increased in a sub-
stantial proportion of both hostile and accepted takeovers in 1985 and
1986. They were increased in 76 percent of targets of successful hostile
takeovers in the year before the bid and in 73 percent of targets two years
before the bid.
But it is in relation to bid premia that the diﬀerences are most pro-
nounced. Panel A of table 10.7 records that in the sample of forty targets
target shareholders received bid premia of –0.9 percent during the month
of the bid (i.e., “month 0”), calculated on an equal weighted basis. These
bid premia are raw equity returns with no adjustment for market move-
ments or risk. Bid premia for months –4 to 1 on the same basis were 4.9
percent. Bid premia were therefore little diﬀerent from zero. In contrast,
Franks and Mayer (1996) report bid premia of between 20 and 30 percent
for hostile and agreed bids during 1985 and 1986 in the United Kingdom.
The picture that emerges is one of cooperative consolidations between
merging ﬁrms in the ﬁrst half of the century. The support of management
was required for approval by shareholders. Bid premia were low, the me-
dium of exchange usually involved share exchanges, management was fre-
quently kept on the target board, and dividend changes were modest. Since
acquisitions frequently involved share exchanges, acquiring ﬁrms avoided
the devaluation of their currency that dual-class shares would have entailed.
The absence of dual-class shares in the ﬁrst half of the century may there-
fore have been intimately linked to the importance of takeovers and their
form of ﬁnancing.
This picture of cooperation and little competition was dramatically al-
tered in the 1950s, as we will describe in section 10.6.
10.5 Three Case Studies
This section describes three cases that illustrate the way in which three
prominent British ﬁrms expanded during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries; the contribution of acquisitions to their growth; the
changing nature of family ownership and board representation; and the
contribution of incorporation and mergers to that process.
10.5.1 Case Study of GKN
Dowlais Iron Company was set up in 1759 in the village of Dowlais near
Merthyr Tydﬁl in South Wales. John Guest was appointed as manager of
Dowlais in 1767, and his grandson became the company’s sole owner in
1851. The Dowlais Iron Company was at this stage the largest ironworks in
the world, operating eighteen blast furnaces and employing more than
7,300 people. The business was the ﬁrst licensee of the Bessemer process,
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its ﬁrst Bessemer steel in 1865.
The Keen family established the Patent Nut and Bolt Company in 1856
in Smethwick, England. In July 1900, Guest, Keen, and Company Limited
was incorporated in Birmingham with the purpose of taking over the
Dowlais Iron Company and the Patent Nut and Bolt Co., Ltd. The share-
holders of the two companies received 250,000 ordinary shares. At the
same time, 400,000 ordinary shares were issued via public subscription,
and the company was ﬂoated with 546 ordinary shareholders and more
than 2,000 preference shareholders. Both classes of shares were traded on
the London and Birmingham Stock Exchanges. There was no evidence of
the company’s being dispersed before 1900: the company history suggests
that both Dowlais Iron Co. and the Patent Nut and Bolt were 100 percent
owned by directors and their families. Evidence for this comes from a com-
parison of directors’ holdings with the shareholdings of the two companies
before the merger. Since directors’ holdings after the ﬂotation were 33.6
percent of the ordinary shares, and the newly issued shares were 400,000,
compared with a pre-issue total of 250,000 we can compute a lower bound
of directors’ ownership pre-issue of 87.3 percent.
In 1902 the company acquired Nettlefold and Company, one of the
world’s leading manufacturers of screws and fasteners, which set up in
Smethwick in 1854, by issuing 315,000 new ordinary shares. The new com-
pany name then became Guest, Keen, and Nettlefolds Limited, and Mr.
Edward Nettlefold joined the board. By 1910, the directors held 26.4 per-
cent of issued ordinary shares. In 1920, shares in Guest, Keen, and Nettle-
folds Ltd. (GKN) were quoted at Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiﬀ, Edin-
burgh, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheﬃeld, while the prices of
the transactions were marked (i.e., reported) on the oﬃcial list of the LSE.
A crucial decade in the evolution of ownership and control of GKN was
then about to begin. First, the company acquired John Lysaght Limited of
Bristol (also quoted in Bristol and London) in one of the largest tender
oﬀers of the decade.5 In November 1923 GKN then undertook two other
major tender oﬀers, acquiring D. Davis and Sons and Consolidated Cam-
brian of Cardiﬀ.
As a consequence of these acquisitions there was a huge increase in the
number of shareholders: GKN had about 1,000 shareholders before 1920,
and more than 20,000 in 1924. At this stage, GKN was one of the largest
manufacturing businesses in the world, involved in every stage of manu-
facturing from coal and ore extraction to iron and steel making and ﬁnally
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5. Details of the deal are as follows: in January 1920, GKN issued 1,989,919 new ordinary
shares and 2,652,331 preference shares. Ordinary shareholders of John Lysaght Ltd. were
oﬀered four new second preference and three new ordinary shares in GKN for every three or-
dinary shares held.to ﬁnished products including the nuts, bolts, screws, and fasteners, for
which it was renowned during this period.
On June 14, 1946, GKN formally listed on the LSE. By then the direc-
tors owned a negligible stake, and the largest shareholder of the period was
the Royal Bank of Scotland, with 2.37 percent of issued ordinary shares. In
the second half of the century, Prudential Assurance, Norwich Union Life
Insurance, Schroder Investment Management, and Scottish Widows In-
vestment Management, among others, alternated as the largest sharehold-
ers, with stakes varying from 3 percent to 5.25 percent of issued equity cap-
ital.
The picture that emerges from GKN is of a ﬁrm whose shares were ini-
tially traded on local provincial exchanges, that expanded rapidly through
acquisitions and broadened its shareholder base both numerically and ge-
ographically in the process, and that by the beginning of the second half of
the twentieth century was widely held primarily by institutional share-
holders.
10.5.2 Case Study of Schweppes
In 1783, forty-three-year-old German-born Jean Jacob Schweppe in-
vented an eﬃcient system for the manufacture of mineral water. In 1790,
he entered a partnership to expand the business and established a factory
in London. Around 1800 he changed his and the business’s name to
Schweppes, while continuing to expand on a national scale. By 1831,
J. Schweppes and Co. became the Supplier of Soda Water to the Royal
Household. In 1834, John Kemp-Welch and William Evill bought
J. Schweppes and Co. and extended the product range to include ﬂavored
soda drinks such as lemonade. The following year the ﬁrm was awarded the
royal warrant by Queen Victoria, and in 1851 it won the contract to supply
“Temperance” beverages at the Great Exhibition in the United Kingdom.
By 1870, the ﬁrm’s product range included tonic water and ginger ale. The
former rapidly became popular with the British in India, as it contained
quinine, which was used as a preventive measure against malaria. In 1877
the ﬁrm opened its ﬁrst factory in Sydney, Australia, and seven years later
a factory in Brooklyn, New York.
The sudden death of John Kemp-Welch in 1885 precipitated the forma-
tion of Schweppes as a limited company in the following year. Although no
direct evidence exists on the ownership structure at this stage, it would
appear that the company was 100 percent owned by the directors until
its public ﬂotation in London on March 6, 1897. After ﬂotation the direc-
tors and their families held collectively 27.2 percent of the 300,000 ordinary
shares. The new company, Schweppes plc, was incorporated to acquire
the business of J. Schweppe and Co. established in 1783, and a total of
£1,250,000 new capital (of which £300,000 was perpetual debenture stock
issued to the directors and £950,000 was a public subscription, in the form
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ferred shares).
The public ﬂotation was extremely successful and oversubscribed. At
the end of 1897, there were more than 1,650 ordinary shareholders and 750
preference shareholders. There was evidence of the company’s shares being
traded in Manchester.
In 1919 the Kemp-Welch family relinquished the chairmanship (al-
though two members remained on the board until the early 1940s), and
under the new chairman, Sir Ivor Phillips, the company started a new pe-
riod of expansion. Overseas development was conducted through a newly
formed fully owned subsidiary, Schweppes (Colonial and Foreign) Ltd.
The strategy was to manufacture locally in the overseas countries, in order
to reduce the group’s reliance on exports. At the end of Sir Phillips’s chair-
manship in 1940, the company had more than 2,700 ordinary sharehold-
ers, and it was formally listed on the LSE on December 19, 1942.
During the 1950s there were several major acquisitions paid in shares:
L. Rose and Co. acquired in 1957 with 1,544,400 new ordinary shares, and
Chivers and Sons, W. P. Hartley, and W. Moorhouse all acquired in 1959
with together 4,000,000 new ordinary shares. In 1969, Schweppes plc
merged with the Cadbury Group to form Cadbury-Schweppes.
10.5.3 Case Study of Cadbury
In 1794, Richard Cadbury, a prominent Quaker, moved from the West
Country in Britain to Birmingham. Thirty years later his son John opened
a shop at 93 Bull Street, then a fashionable part of Birmingham, to sell tea,
coﬀee, hops, mustard, and a new sideline—cocoa and drinking chocolate,
which John prepared himself using a mortar and a pestle.
In 1847 John Cadbury took his brother Benjamin into partnership in
1847, changing the name of the business to Cadbury Brothers of Birming-
ham, and renting a new factory in Bridge Street in the center of Birming-
ham. Thanks to a reduction in tax on imported cocoa beans, the business
expanded and received the ﬁrst of a series of royal warrants of appointment
by Queen Victoria.
The Cadbury Brothers moved their manufacturing operations to Bourn-
ville, United Kingdom, and established the Bournville factory and village,
which became an important addition to the U.K. industrial landscape.
By the time that Cadbury Brothers was incorporated as a limited com-
pany (on June 16, 1899), and the Bournville factory had 2,600 employees.
At that stage, Richard and George Cadbury, the sons of the late John Cad-
bury, owned 100 percent of the ordinary shares.
A crucial year in the company history was 1919, when Cadbury Brothers
merged with J. S. Fry and Sons of Bristol, whose product range (e.g., Turk-
ish delight) complemented Cadbury’s chocolates. After the merger, the new
company was registered as British Cocoa and Chocolate on May 19, 1919,
600 Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossiwith a capital of £2,500,000. The two families shared both board seats and
company ownership, with the Frys holding four seats on the board as well
as the chairmanship and 45.44 percent of ordinary shares, and the Cad-
burys holding the rest (six seats on the board, and 54.56 percent of ordinary
shares). Another former director of Fry also sat on the board.
As the company’s operations expanded and factories opened around the
world, the Fry family board representation declined, while Cadbury’s in-
creased. Shortly before the merger with Schweppes plc in 1969, the Cad-
bury family held the chairmanship and seven of the thirteen seats of the
board of directors, while only one Fry remained on the board. The Cad-
bury family held slightly more than 50 percent of the ordinary shares, while
the Fry family held just over 10 percent. The rest was dispersed among
more than 200 ordinary shareholders. There was evidence of trade on both
London and Birmingham Stock Exchanges of ordinary and preference
shares before the merger with Schweppes in 1969.
These three case studies illustrate the speed with which ownership was
dispersed and how much of the dilution of the original family’s ownership
was due to acquisitions for share exchanges. They also show how one of the
founding families came to dominate the merged entity even where the
merger was apparently between equals. This dominance persisted as the
ownership of the founding family dwindled.
10.6 Takeovers in the Second Half of the Century
In the spring of 1953, Charles Clore, a self-made millionaire from busi-
ness and property ventures, launched a bid for J. Sears and Co., the parent
company of a shoe shop chain, Freeman, Hardy, and Willis. Instead of fol-
lowing the conventional approach of negotiating with target management,
Clore mailed oﬀer documents directly to Sears’s shareholders over the
heads of management. Roberts (1992) writes, “The Sears directors, who
were taken entirely unawares, retaliated by announcing the tripling of the
dividend. Shareholders were astonished by this sudden largesse, which was
perceived as a desperate and irresponsible act on the part of the manage-
ment. Faith in the incumbent board being thoroughly undermined, there
was a rush to sell to Clore, who quickly acquired control of the company.
‘We never thought anything like this would happen to us’, were the Par-
thian words of the outgoing Sears’ chairman” (p. 186).
The unconventional nature of the approach was reﬂected in exceptional
ﬁnancial features of the bid. In contrast to the observation made above that
dividends did not in general change around acquisitions, the Sears direc-
tors responded to the bid by tripling the value of their dividend. While the
average value of bid premia had historically been around zero, the bid pre-
mium for Sears was 90 percent in the month of the bid and 122 percent in
the ﬁve months from month –4 to 1.
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mia that were very large by previous standards. In the case of the bid by
Land Securities Investment Trust in autumn 1953 for the Savoy Hotel Co.,
owners of the Savoy, Claridge’s, and Simpson’s in the Strand, the bid pre-
mium was 19 percent in the month of the bid and 87 percent in the ﬁve
months around the bid. In the bid for British Aluminum by Reynolds Met-
als of Virginia in 1958, the month-zero bid premium was 17 percent and the
ﬁve-month bid premium was 17 percent.
It is not entirely clear why the takeover market emerged at this juncture
in Britain. Alfred Chandler associates the emergence of a market for cor-
porate control in the United States with the rise in institutional sharehold-
ing (Chandler 1990). But, as table 10.3 shows, in the United Kingdom the
market for corporate control predated the accumulation of most institu-
tional shareholdings. A more plausible explanation is that the tighter ﬁ-
nancial disclosures required of company accounts by the 1948 Companies
Act provided the basis on which corporate predators could for the ﬁrst time
make reasonably accurate estimates of asset values and earnings, and thus
launch bids without the cooperation of the target (Hannah 1974b). In
Charles Clore’s takeover of Sears, Roberts (1992) reports that “Clore
launched his attack on being informed by a partner in the estates agent
Healey & Baker that Sears’ balance sheet under-estimated the real estate
value of the ﬁrm’s 900 high street stores by £10 million” (p. 186).
The response of the corporate sector was to seek protection against the
rapidly emerging takeover market. It initially received a sympathetic ear
from the government and the Bank of England, which were concerned about
the impact of hostile acquisitions on the corporate sector and the govern-
ment’s policy of dividend restraint (Roberts 1992). All levels of government
wereinvolved—including, in the case of the bid for the Savoy, the prime min-
ister, Winston Churchill, who was worried about the possible impact of the
bid on his favorite dining club at the Savoy. But while it found this form of
buccaneering capitalism distasteful and ungentlemanly, the government felt
impotent to do much about it, and in any event, by the time of the next
merger wave at the end of the 1950s, it had come around to the view that “Mr.
Clore appears to have improved the retail shoe trade of the country.”
Unable to gain protection from the government, the corporate sector be-
gan to erect its own defenses. Table 10.8 reports incidence of antitakeover
measures in three years: 1950, 1965, and 1975. In the case of 1965 and 1975
the table also shows changes (adoptions of antitakeover defenses in exist-
ing companies, emergence of new companies with antitakeover defenses,
and abandonment by existing companies) from 1950 and 1965, respec-
tively. Antitakeover measures are said to exist if any of the following are
present: dual-class shares, voting restrictions, or share blocks by insiders in
excess of 50 percent. Statistics are reported for three LSE sector classiﬁca-
tions: commercial and industrial, breweries and distilleries, and iron, coal,
and steel, which totals more than 2,000 companies.
602 Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano RossiTable 10.8 reports that the number of companies with antitakeover mea-
sures increased from 73 in 1950 to 249 in 1965. This represents an increase
in incidence of antitakeover measures from 3.7 percent of the sample to
11.1 percent between 1950 and 1965. There were 100 new adoptions by
companies that were already in existence in 1950, and ninety-two new com-
panies were formed with antitakeoverdefenses.6 The incidence of takeover
defenses therefore increased substantially during the 1950s and 1960s.7
A further form of takeover defense that emerged was to seek protection
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Table 10.8 Incidence of antitakeover measures
No. of  % of listed 
companies companies
A. 1950
Commercial and industrial 56 3.60
Breweries and distilleries 13 6.30
Iron, coal, and steel 4 1.82
Total 73 3.68
Static analysis Dynamic analysis (since 1950)
No. of  % of listed  New 
companies companies Adoptions companies Delisting
B. 1965
Commercial and industrial 236 11.80 98 86 4
Breweries and distilleries 10 10.20 2 4 9
Iron, coal, and steel 3 2.21 0 2 3
Total 249 11.15 100 92 16
Static analysis Dynamic analysis (since 1965)
No. of  % of listed  New 
companies companies Adoptions companies Dropped Delisting
C. 1975
Commercial and industrial 145 7.25 18 7 32 84
Breweries and distilleries 6 6.06 1 0 1 4
Iron, coal, and steel 1 2.08 0 0 1 1
Total 152 7.08 19 7 34 89
Source: Own calculations.
Note: This table reports the incidence of antitakeover measures (dual-class voting, voting restrictions
and insider ownership greater than 50 percent) in the United Kingdom in 1950 in panel A, 1965 in panel
B, and 1975 in panel C.
6. There is a residual of sixteen companies that were delisted.
7. The companies with antitakeover measures were nonacquisitive companies and did not
therefore expect to use their own shares to purchase other companies.under the wing of a friendly company. The brewing industry was particu-
larly fragmented, with a large number of small local brewers. Whitbread
took share stakes in several of these as a way of providing protection
against hostile bidders.
For a brief period during the 1950s and 1960s, the landscape of corpo-
rate Britain began to resemble that of Continental Europe. There was an
unregulated takeover market with the potential for acquiring control
through purchases of partial share stakes and discriminatory oﬀers. Com-
panies responded by introducing dual-class shares and voting right re-
strictions, and pyramid structures emerged as companies sought protec-
tion under the wing of others.
But these takeover defenses met with stiﬀ opposition from an inﬂuential
quarter—the institutional investors and the LSE. They were concerned
about the interference with the takeover process, the ability of manage-
ment to entrench itself behind takeover defenses, and the withdrawal of
their voting rights. Under pressure from the institutions, the stock ex-
change made it known that it disapproved of the use of dual-class shares
and would not permit their use in new equity issues.
The intervention of the institutions and the stock exchange proved deci-
sive, and during the 1970s and 1980s companies steadily withdrew dual-
class shares. Panel C of table 10.8 reports that by 1975 the proportion of
listed companies with dual-class shares in the three sectors had declined
from 11.1 percent to 7.1 percent. The number of companies in the com-
mercial and industrial sector that dropped dual-class shares between 1965
and 1975 was well in excess of those that adopted them. By the late 1980s
there were only a handful of companies with dual-class shares left among
listed companies in the United Kingdom.
Meanwhile, under prompting from the Bank of England, in 1959 the city
established a working party to produce a code of conduct for takeovers.
This initially yielded a series of ineﬀectual recommendations, but, in the
face of several prominent takeover scandals8 and under the looming threat
of legislation, in 1967 it produced the City Code on Take-Overs and Merg-
ers and created the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers to enforce it.9This in
due course established the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders,
the requirement of acquiring ﬁrms to disclose their shareholdings and re-
veal their intentions, and the obligation to make oﬀers for all shares at
highest prices once 30 percent of the target ﬁrm’s shares had been ac-
quired. In other words, it re-created by self-regulation the equal price treat-
ment that had prevailed by convention without regulation in the ﬁrst half
of the century before hostile takeovers.
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8. One example of this was the Jasper Aﬀair in 1959, involving takeover malpractice and the
misuse of building society funds.
9. The power of the panel to sanction ﬁrms that do not comply with the code has proved to
be highly eﬀective.What is striking about these developments is the fact that the political
process was not at the end of the day guided by the interests of the cor-
porate sector, which sought to limit hostile bids and to erect takeover de-
fenses, but by those of the ﬁnancial institutions. It was the institutions
that prevented ﬁrms from implementing dual-class shares and the insti-
tutions that drew up the rules by which takeovers were subsequently con-
ducted. It was therefore the ﬁnancial sector that prevented the United
Kingdom from drifting into a Continental-style corporate structure with
dual-class shares, pyramids, and limitations on takeovers, and that set
the ground rules by which an active market in corporate control could
develop. Through the takeover code and panel, the ﬁnancial sector also
prevented the corporate sector from erecting the takeover defenses, in
particular poison pills, that became commonplace in the United States.
The distinct nature of the U.K. corporate sector is therefore in part a con-
sequence of the dominance of equity institutions that placed shareholder
returns above the private interests of either corporate shareholders or
management.
10.7 Conclusions
This paper has documented the rapid erosion of family ownership of
U.K. corporations during the twentieth century. The dispersed ownership
that characterizes the U.K. corporate system today emerged early in the
twentieth century. The United Kingdom did not start oﬀ life in the twenti-
eth century like Germany or Italy today. In terms of ownership concentra-
tion and the involvement of families, it looked more like the United King-
dom today than Germany or Italy.
The observations on the dominance of families in the running of ﬁrms
are a reﬂection of their board representation rather than their ownership.
Board participation by families became disproportionate to their owner-
ship stakes. There were good reasons for being concerned about this devel-
opment. The divergence between ownership and control undermined the
eﬃcient running of corporations, as documented by Chandler.
But what was remarkable about this was the process by which it came
about. The decline in family ownership was not for the most part a conse-
quence of families’ selling out but a result of equity issues. These equity is-
sues were not primarily used to ﬁnance internal growth (there was rather
little use of equity for this purpose in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century)
but to acquire other companies. Equity-ﬁnanced acquisitions accounted
for a high proportion of the dilution of family holdings.
What is equally striking is the fact that these substantial equity issues
took place against the background of informal, largely unregulated stock
markets. Nevertheless, shareholders trusted directors to uphold principles
of equal price treatment for all. There was little evidence of the partial
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ket in many countries today.
Why directors abided by this and were not tempted to accept cheaper
partial oﬀers at the expense of minority investors is not entirely clear. But
one clue comes from the signiﬁcance of acquisitions and equity issuance
to the growth of corporations. Large British companies were particularly
reliant on the stock market to fund growth. This may reﬂect the absence of
a local banking system of a type that exists in many other countries and
through which companies in those countries are able to establish close re-
lations and borrow on an ongoing basis. To be able to access the stock mar-
ket, companies in the United Kingdom had to sustain the trust of their
shareholders, which in part revolved around ensuring that they were
equally treated in new share issues. Discriminatory oﬀers might reduce the
costs of particular acquisitions, but these were more than oﬀset by the
higher cost of using equity in subsequent acquisitions. Regulation was not
therefore required since it was in the self-interest of directors to ensure the
fair treatment of their shareholders.
The nondiscriminatory treatment of shareholders in takeovers also goes
some way toward explaining the absence of pyramids in the United King-
dom. Acquirers were not able to purchase the partial share stakes in com-
panies that would have allowed them to create pyramids. Target ﬁrms were
absorbed into the merged company and essentially disappeared as separate
listed entities.
However, this collaborative arrangement broke down in the middle of
the century in the face of a hostile takeover market. Target directors were
no longer in a position to enforce equal price rules since acquirers could
go behind their backs and appeal directly to controlling shareholders. Di-
rectors initially tried to protect themselves and their minority investors by
erecting takeover defenses. For a brief period, the United Kingdom took
on the appearance of Continental Europe, with dual-class shares, pyra-
mids, and discriminatory price acquisitions. But the takeover defenses in-
curred the wrath of the institutions, which mounted a successful attack on
them through the stock exchange and succeeded in devising the rules by
which takeovers were to be conducted.
Once again the development of the U.K. corporate sector was deter-
mined by the interests of shareholders to a degree that probably did not oc-
cur in most other countries. At an optimistic level, the reason for the odd-
ity of the United Kingdom noted at the start is the well-developed and
eﬃcient nature of its stock market and the dominance of ﬁnancial institu-
tions that eschewed the private beneﬁts of Continental Europe. Equally
plausibly, it is a consequence of its centralized banking system and the un-
usual reliance of its corporate sector on the stock market during the twen-
tieth century.
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In this paper Franks, Mayer, and Rossi signiﬁcantly advance our under-
standing of the history of corporate ownership in the United Kingdom. To
be sure, the ﬁrst phenomenon they trace, the decline of family ownership,
is well known. The modest capital requirements, limited scale, and family-
based ownership structure of early nineteenth-century manufacturing en-
terprise are staples of the history of the British industrial revolution. In the
1820s the typical Manchester cotton mill employed 100 to 200 operatives
and required capital investment of perhaps £9,000. Neither shared owner-
ship nor separation between ownership and control were essential for es-
tablishing or operating such an enterprise. But by the middle of the nine-
teenth century, with changes in technology and the extent of the market,
the representative cotton mill had grown larger, often by several orders of
magnitude. Increasingly, specialized management and complex modes of
raising capital became the order of the day. Responding to this reality, ﬁrst
joint-stock companies and then limited liability were sanctioned by Parlia-
ment in 1844 and 1856.1 Companies sold shares to individual investors as
a way of raising funds for now more extensive investment. They established
boards of directors to help run these more complex organizations. With the
second industrial revolution centered on the steel, chemical, and engineer-
ing industries at the end of the nineteenth century, the importance of scale,
scope, and therefore ﬁxed investment and outside ﬁnance grew more im-
portant still. Share issuance and professional management became the rule
rather than the exception. In this way the forward march of technology and
markets progressively diluted family ownership and control.
In addition, there is a prominent strand of historical writing on Britain’s
loss of its early nineteenth-century economic preeminence (the “clogs to
clogs in three generations” interpretation) that blames the grandsons of
the founding generation of industrialists for eﬀectively running into the
ground the ﬁrms that their forbears had so diligently worked to create. Ed-
ucated in the humanities rather than management, the third generation
poured its energies—and ﬁnancial resources—into politics and landed es-
tates rather than the further development of the family ﬁrm. The minority
of early nineteenth-century ﬁrms that survived were sold oﬀ to other own-
ers with more narrowly economic objectives.2
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1. These had been available previously through private acts of Parliament, but more re-
strictively.
2. An inﬂuential interpretation along these lines is Landes (1969, p. 336 and following). To
quote, “Thus the Britain of the late nineteenth century basked complacently in the sunset of
economic hegemony. In many ﬁrms, the grandfather who started the business and built it byWhile not speaking directly to this interpretation of Britain’s so-called
relative economic decline, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi shed considerable new
light on the dynamics of ownership and control. They show that loss of
family control was often the price of public share issues ﬂoated to raise ﬁ-
nance not for internal investment but to ﬁnance expansion through merg-
ers with competing ﬁrms. Although there are hints of this ﬁnding in, inter
alia, Hannah (1976), it has not been documented as thoroughly before. An-
other of the authors’ ﬁndings, which appears to be entirely new, is that fam-
ilies, even while having their ownership position diluted, were able to retain
control to a surprising extent by occupying a disproportionate number of
seats on the board of what was no longer the family ﬁrm (often even chair-
ing the board). Moreover, most directors of the company that was the tar-
get of the acquisition, and even the chairman, retained a position on the
new board. Adherents of the “clogs to clogs in three generations” thesis
will nod their heads at this ﬁnding, although this is not a connection that
the present authors pursue.
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi then document the gradual erosion of dis-
proportionate family control in the second half of the twentieth century,
reﬂecting the growing inﬂuence of hostile takeovers and institutional in-
vestors. Indeed, what they document is not merely an erosion but a trans-
formation. Whereas families possessed board representation dispropor-
tionate to their ownership at the beginning of the twentieth century, by the
end of the century substantial family-controlled voting blocks were even
less common than in other advanced economies. In the United Kingdom
today, dual-class shares through which block holders—often, in other coun-
tries, family members—share ownership but not control are virtually un-
known.
Whatexplains this transformation? Franks, Mayer, and Rossi argue that
disproportionate family representation on the boards of the merged public
companies was made possible by the weakness of minority investors’
rights. This is consistent with the older historical literature critical of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century stock ﬂotations and mergers,
through which minority investors were often ripped oﬀ.3 But, partly in re-
sponse to earlier scandals, protection for minority investors was strength-
ened after World War II. Important reforms included strengthened disclo-
sure requirements through the adoption of the 1948 Companies Act. The
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unremitting application and by thrift bordering on miserliness had long died; the father who
took over a solid enterprise and, starting with larger ambitions, raised it to undreamed-of-
heights, has passed on the reins; now it was the turn of the third generation, the children of
aﬄuence, tired of the tedium of trade and ﬂushed with the bucolic aspiration of the country
gentlemen. (One might more accurately speak of ‘shirtsleeves to hunting jacket—or dress
coat, or ermine robes—in three generations’.) Many of them retired and forced the conver-
sion of their ﬁrms into joint-stock companies. Others stayed on and went through the motions
of entrepreneurship between the long weekends.”
3. See, for example, Macrosty (1907).ability of minority investors to vote with their feet and the ability of ﬁrms
to launch takeovers on the basis of publicly available information (and thus
without the cooperation of the potential target) led to the development of
a market in corporate control that threatened the entrenched position of
board members. The latter attempted to defend themselves by building
large block holdings, developing strategic alliances, and issuing dual-class
shares on a signiﬁcant scale for the ﬁrst time in British history. But that de-
fense proved temporary: institutional investors, who worked hand in glove
with the stock exchange, were able to impose sanctions against ﬁrms that
engaged in such practices, denying them access to outside ﬁnance, if, for
example, they sought to use dual-class issues in new equity ﬂotations. The
city was able to strengthen sanctions against directors who did not advance
the interests of all shareholders, including minority investors, with its Code
on Take-Overs and Mergers in 1967. Regulation, notably as a result of the
establishment of the Takeover Panel in 1968, cemented this new equilib-
rium.4
It is worth observing that this account is not obviously consistent with
the currently fashionable literature emphasizing Britain’s common-law tra-
dition as an explanation for the precocious development of its ﬁnancial
markets.5 Protection for minority investors went from relatively weak in
the second half of the nineteenth century to relatively strong in the second
half of the twentieth despite no obvious change in legal inheritance.
Rather, legal and institutional reforms protecting minority investors re-
sponded to past scandals; thus, they may have had an element of path de-
pendence. They also responded to politics and policy in the manner argued
by Rajan and Zingales (2003). The openness of the British economy to
trade and ﬁnance prevented entrenched interests from closing down its ﬁ-
nancial markets in response to the crisis of the 1930s and thereby dimin-
ishing the markets’ inﬂuence, in the manner of other countries. As a result,
the market power and political sway of the institutional-investor commu-
nity—and the big ﬁnancial institutions in particular—suﬃced to force
through reforms strengthening minority investor rights and creating a true
market in corporate control.
At this point the reader, his appetite having been whetted, wants to learn
more. He wants to know about the nature of the changes in British ﬁnan-
cial markets and the economy, presumably produced by the crisis of the
1930s and World War II, that enhanced the power of the big ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, allowing them to eﬀectively discipline directors and protect mi-
nority investors where they had not been able to do so before. He wants to
know why big ﬁnancial institutions, which were certainly not unrepre-
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4. Although the authors only imply, as opposed to arguing, that this too was a consequence
of the growing inﬂuence of institutional investors.
5. See, for example, LaPorta et al. (1998).sented in countries like Germany, Japan, and France, did not have a simi-
lar tendency to suppress big block holdings, family control, and director
autonomy. If it is the precocious development of British ﬁnancial markets
that accounts for the inﬂuence of institutional investors, one wonders
whether a legal tradition conducive to ﬁnancial deepening may have been
responsible for these developments after all. Or was the emergence of large
institutional investors itself a response to the weakness of minority share-
holder rights and the shortcomings of investor protection? If inadequate
information disclosure and the absence of sanctions against self-interested
directors are the explanations for why there did not exist a thriving market
in corporate control until the second half of the twentieth century, as the
authors argue, then how is one to understand Sylla and Smith’s (1995) em-
phasis on the Directors Liability Act of 1890 (which made company direc-
tors liable for statements in prospectuses soliciting buyers for company
shares) and the Companies Act of 1900, which strengthened the principle
of compulsory corporate disclosure, as the explanation for why British ﬁ-
nancial markets developed so rapidly around the turn of the century, to the
point where they quickly overtook those of the United States? At a mini-
mum, this suggests that the 1948 Companies Act and the 1967 Code on
Take-Overs and Mergers were not radical departures from the status quo
ante; rather, they had a prehistory whose economic archeology deserves to
be uncovered.
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